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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2, this action having come to the Supreme Court from the summary judgment granted
to Defendants Hoopiiaina and Forsyth (hereinafter "Appellants") by Judge Anthony Quinn
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4), the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
issued its opinion on June 16,2005, reversing the ruling of the trial court. Appellants filed
a Motion for Writ of Certiorari which was granted by this Court on September 21, 2005.
Therefore, this Court retains its jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether Appellees' quiet title action is subject to applicable statutes of limitations.
"When exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, we review the decision of the court of appeals
and not that of the trial court." Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, ^ 13,9 P.3d 762.
"On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness." Brookside
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, PI 1, 48 P.3d 968.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
UTAH STATUTES:
78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property - Authorized.
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
1

estate or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
75-3-1006. Limitations on actions and proceedings against distributees.
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy proceeding or in
a proceeding settling the accounts of a personal representative or otherwise
barred, the claim of any claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to
pay the claim, and the right of any heir or devisee or of a successor personal
representative acting in their behalf, to recover property improperly distributed
or the value thereof from any distributee is barred at the later of:
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the decedent, one year after the
decedent's death; and
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at the later of:
(i) three years after the decedent's death; or
(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof.
(2) This section does not bar an action to recover property or value
received as the result of fraud.
78-12-19. Actions to recover estate sold by executor or administrator.
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by an executor or
administrator in the course of any probate proceeding can be maintained by
any heir or other person claiming under the decedent, unless it is commenced
within three years next after such sale. An action to set aside the sale may be
instituted and maintained at any time within three years from the discovery of
the fraud or other lawful grounds upon which the action is based.
78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided,
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within
four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time
2

for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
UTAH COURT RULES:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed a quiet title action in an attempt to acquire title and possession o r real

property owned by Defendants. Defendants filed a quiet title counterclaim to eliminate
Plaintiffs' claims. This case was consolidated with a probate action prosecuted by Plaintiffs
to name a successor trustee and attempt to convey the real property to Plaintiffs.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In the trial court, Defendant, Cuma Hoopiiaina, individually and as personal

representative of the estate of Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, and Defendant Marlin Forsyth filed
3

a motion for summary judgment which was heard before the Honorable Judge Anthony
Quinn on November 26, 2003. The Honorable Judge Anthony Quinn granted Defendants'
motion for summary judgment ruling that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims
and dismissed the Plaintiffs' cause of action. This ruling was appealed by Plaintiffs to the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations did not apply
to quiet title actions and that the trustor of a trust may not breach the trust. Defendants filed
a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court on September 21,
2005. This appeal is now pending before the Supreme Court of Utah.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On April 10, 1974 Malualani B. Hoopiiaina ("Malu") executed two trust

agreements relating to real property located at 345 West 700 South and 349 West 700 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah ("Property") and naming himself, his daughter Inez Gatlin, and LaRayne
J. Harman and Donald Hartman as trustees. These trust documents were recorded in the Salt
Lake County Recorder's office on April 18, 1974. The beneficiaries of these trusts were
LaRayne J. Harman and Donald Hartman, respectively, and the remainder beneficiaries were
Malu's daughter, Inez Gatlin, and her children, Plaintiffs Samantha Gatlin and Michael
Gatlin ("Plaintiffs"). (R. 12-15, 37-40).
2.

On many occasions, Malu told his granddaughter Samantha, that she, her

mother, and her brother would receive the Property represented by the trusts. In the Affidavit
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of Samantha Gatlin she states:
11. That affiant's grandfather, Malualani B. Hoopiiaina,
had on many occasions advised affiant that affiant's mother,
affiant, and affiant's brother were the beneficiaries of a Trust as
to the above-described real property located at 349 West 700
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as described above.
(R. 397, 378, f 11)
3.

From the time Samantha was a young girl, she was told by her mother that she

and her brother Michael were beneficiaries of trusts established by her grandfather, Malu.
(R. 397).
4.

Both Samantha and Michael knew that their grandfather owned the land at 349

West 700 South and 345 West 700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 397).
5.

Inez Gatlin died on April 24, 1996. (R. 399, 299). Malu died on May 20,

1997. (R. 397). Malu was the last living trustee of the trusts.
6.

Prior to the time that Samantha received notice of the probate proceeding

relating to her grandfather's death, Samantha went to the county clerk's office and received
a copy of the holographic will that was on file there. (R. 398).
7.

When Samantha realized that she had been written out of the will and that the

will made no reference to the trust, she contacted and met with Phil Dyer, an attorney in Salt
Lake City. At the meeting with Mr. Dyer, Samantha spoke to him about the trusts as well as
the will. (R. 398).
8.

At the time of the probate hearing on her grandfather's will, on June 25,1997,

5

Samantha appeared before the probate court and voiced her objection to the proceedings.
After a discussion with Mr. Fadel, the attorney for Malu' s estate, Samantha returned with Mr.
Fadel to the judge's chambers and waived her objection. (R. 398).
9.

Despite the proceeding at the probate court, Samantha still believed that there

was a trust in which she had an interest and that nothing had changed. (R. 398).
10.

Plaintiff Michael Gatlin also learned that he was not going to receive any of

the Property he had been promised. On or about July 7,1997, Michael called George Fadel
concerning notice of his grandfather's death and the trusts and was informed that he would
not be receiving any of the Property that he believed he had been promised. Thereafter,
George Fadel sent a copy of the will to Michael. Michael then called Mr. Fadel and asked
again about the trusts and was told that he would not receive any Property. (R. 299, 302).
11.

This action was brought before the Third Judicial District Court on October 10,

2002. (R. 1).
12.

Malu's holographic will, dated March 6,1996, was found to be Malu's last will

and testament. Samantha sought and acquired a copy of the will from the court clerk's
office. (R. 398).
13.

The codicils of the holographic will states:

Codicil My daughter Inez Gatlin having died, I remove all provisions for Inez
and her children.
May 23, 1996.
/s/Malualani B. Hoopiiaina.
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Codicil Marlin Forsyth to share in the 349 West properties 700 South with his
mother Cuma equally (50-50). Marlin will receive apartment # 10 Casa de
Encidero, Hawaii, free and clear and unit # 106 will be free and clear to
mother Cuma.
(R. 399).
14.

When Samantha read the will and realized that she had been written out of the

will, she cried. (R. 399).
15.

Samantha does not believe that George Fadel intended to misrepresent anything

relating to the trust agreement. In her Deposition she states:
Q. Do you have any information that leads you to conclude or believe
that George Fadel intended to misrepresent to you anything relating to the trust
agreements you seek to enforce in this lawsuit?
Mr. Olsen: I have no objection to that.
The Witness: That he purposefully?
Q. (By Mr. Gibbs) Urn - hum.
A. No, I think what he told me at the probate hearing, I believe he was
very sincere.
(R. 399).
16.

In Malu's probate proceeding, Defendant Cuma Hoopiiaina, personal

representative, conveyed the Property pursuant to probate court order to Malu's heirs. (R. 2224,41-43)
17.

Cuma Hoopiiaina was not aware of the of the April 18, 1974 trusts executed

byMalu. (R.460,p. 12)
7

18.

George Fidel was a defendant in this action but was voluntarily dismissed by

Plaintiffs on October 9, 2003. (R. 228).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that in a quiet title action the statute of
limitations does not apply. The logical extension of this argument negates the statute of
limitations in quiet title actions. The Court of Appeals ignored this Court's precedent in
making this ruling, because the statute of limitations does apply if the parties seek affirmative
relief when filing their quiet title action. In this case, the Respondents prayed for affirmative
relief, including placing their name on title, invalidating the title of Appellants, terminating
a lis pendens, and seeking possession of the Property. Respondents' remedies reflect their
pursuit of affirmative relief, which subjects their claims to the statute of limitations. Because
the statute of limitations is applicable to Respondents' claims, the Court of Appeals decision
should be reversed.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a beneficiary's claim to enforce a trust is
not subject to the statute of limitations because the trustee can only treat the trust property
pursuant to the terms of the trust. This holding denies the applicability of the doctrines of
breach and repudiation of the trusts by the trustee. When a trustee breaches or repudiates the
trust and treats the trust property as his own, the beneficiary's claim is subject to a statute of
limitations. Because the Court of Appeals failed to impose the applicable statute of
limitations on Respondents' claims, its decision should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO THIS ACTION
A.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO QUIET TITLE ACTIONS
In Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, ^f 18, the Court of Appeals' decision

below held that Respondents' action against Appellants was not time barred despite quoting
Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995, 1001 (1915), which holds that the
statute of limitations applies if Respondents' seek "affirmative relief in their quiet title
action:
. . . actions by which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud from or to
quiet title to real property as against apparent or stale claims are not barred by
the statute of limitations, yet we are also clear that all actions in which the
principle purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief. . . come within the
[statute of limitations] . . . .
Despite citing Branting, the Court of Appeals never addressed what constitutes "apparent or
stale claims" or "affirmative relief or how those standards should be applied.
The Court of Appeals held that no statute of limitations applied in this case since a
quiet title action ".. is premised upon the fact that a quiet title action, as its name connotes,
is one to quiet an existing title . . . and not one brought to establish title.... [T]he effect of
a decree quieting title is not to vest title but rather to perfect an existing title." Id. at \ 18
(citing State ex rel Dep yt ofSoc. Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1979)). In
entering its decision, the Court of Appeals, without elaboration, equates an action to "perfect
an existing title" with an action eliminating "apparent or stale claims." Id.

The ruling

ignores the "affirmative relief standard and essentially finds that as long as a claim is
9

brought as a "quiet title action/' that no statute of limitations will apply.
To assess the "affirmative relief standard, a review of the facts of Branting and
subsequent rulings citing Branting is helpful. In Branting, Salt Lake City ordered the
construction of a sewer and a special tax was assessed to each of the benefitting property
owners. After the sewer was constructed, the tax was assessed that constituted a lien on
Branting's property.

Branting brought an action against Salt Lake City to have the tax

assessment invalidated, remove the cloud on his title, and quiet title in his property. The
Branting court held that Branting sought affirmative relief byfiling a quiet title action which
sought court assistance in declaring that the tax levied against Branting"s property was void
and of no effect. Having determined that Branting had sought "affirmative relief," the court
held that because he had not brought his action to challenge the city's right to assess the tax
within four years, the statute of limitations had expired and his claim was barred.
The Utah Supreme Court relied on the "affirmative relief standard of Branting when
deciding Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374, 376 (1938). In Davidsen,
plaintiff tendered land to the defendant city upon the condition that the city would make
certain improvements to the property, including the installation of a sidewalk and curb and
gutter. When the city refused to perform the improvements, plaintiff filed action to have the
deed set aside because of fraud. The Utah Supreme Court held that seeking to have the deed
to property invalidated, set aside, and possession delivered to plaintiff constituted
"affirmative relief:

10

This court has also held that, although actions by which nothing is
sought except to remove a cloud from or to quiet the title to real property as
against apparent or stale claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, yet
the statute [of limitations] does apply to actions in which the principal purpose
is to obtain some affirmative relief. Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296,
153 P. 995
Plaintiff here asks for affirmative relief other than removal of
a cloud on his title. He is not in possession of the land. He asks that a deed
which he executed to defendant be cancelled for fraud.
Based on its finding that Davidsen sought "affirmative relief," the court held that his claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court again implimented the "affirmative relief standard in Dow
v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249,1252 (Utah App. 1996), by stating that "[a] statute [of limitations]
'applied to all actions, both legal and equitable, in which affirmative relief is sought.5"
(quoting American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1992)).
The court in Dow held that as long as affirmative relief was sought by a party to an action,
then a statute of limitations applies. Therefore, only the quiet title cases seeking to eliminate
"apparent or stale claims" are not subject to a statute of limitations.
The term "affirmative relief connotes a pending action which seeks some relief from
the court, whether embodied in a complaint or counterclaim. "Affirmative relief is a claim
that can be raised and pursued independent of the claim made by the opposing party.
"Affirmative relief is not in the manner of offset, recoupment, contribution, or indemnity,
but seeks assistance from the court in righting an asserted wrong. Sharon Steel Corporation
v.Aetna Casualty andSurety Company, 931 P.2d 127,132(1997). The Utah Supreme Court
has
11

... distinguished between... counterclaims and cross-claims "wherein
the defendant seeks to reduce the amount a plaintiff can recover, such as by
recoupment, contribution, or indemnity, and those wherein the defendant is
seeking affirmative relief." United States ex re I. Bros. Builders Supply Co. v.
Old World Artisans, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1561, 1569-70 (N.D. Ga. 1988); see
alsoAppelbaumv. Ceres LandCo., 546 F. Supp. 17,20 (D.Minn. 1981), q^V/,
687F.2d261 (8th Cir. 1982); State ex rel Egelandv. City Council, 245 Mont.
484, 803 P.2d 609, 613 (Mont. 1990).... [WJhere the defendant's claim is an
"affirmative independent cause of action not in the nature of a defensive
claim," then the claim must befiledwithin the applicable statutory period. Old
World Artisans, 702 F. Supp. at 1569.
Id. See also, Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624,626
(1959)(holding that an ". . . action asking that title be quieted in them and also asking that
in the event title was not quieted in them that appellant herein be required to reimburse them
the amounts they expended for taxes. [S]uch [is] affirmative relief...."); Logan City v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 86 Utah 354, 356, 44 P.2d 698 (1935)(cancellation of a contract is
affirmative relief); Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Mack Co. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88
Utah 67,74,39 P.2d 323,326 (1934)("... affirmative relief may consist of a claim or claims
in the nature of a lien upon the property the plaintiff seeks to recover.")

"Affirmative

relief," therefore, is any requested or prescribed remedy sought by a party which is not in the
nature of recoupment, contribution, setoff, or indemnity.
In the case at bar, Respondents sought "affirmative relief when they asked the trial
court to validate their title to the Property, declare their title superior to that of Appellants,
invalidate the Deed of Distribution conveying the Property from Malu's estate to Appellants,
terminate the lis pendens filed by Appellants, invalidate the existing lease on the Property,
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and grant Respondents possession to the Property. (R. 132) Since Respondents sought
"affirmative relief in their petition, Respondents' claims are subject to the statute of
limitations.
There have been no definitive definitions of what constitutes "apparent or stale
claims." In Branting, "apparent or stale claims" are those claims not subject to the statute
of limitations. The dissent in Nolan, 2005 UT App. 272 (Judge Jackson), asserted that the
determination of whether an action is "against apparent or stale claims" depends on whether
there exists "an active battle between adverse parties." Id. at ]f30. Judge Jackson concludes
that "[i]n Branting itself and all of the cases that Branting cites on this point, the courts
concluded that the parties sought affirmative relief where there were active, adverse
claimants." Id. Therefore, where adverse claimants seek an interest in property, there is
likely to be an active battle between adverse parties. Conversely, apparent and stale claims
are likely not to have adverse parties that seek an interest in property. For example,
mortgages that are unenforceable because of the expiration of the statute of limitations may
constitute "apparent and stale claims." There is not likely to be a mortgage company seeking
to enforce a mortgage that is unenforceable under the statute of limitations. As such, there
would be no statute of limitations applicable to an action to remove such a mortgage from
the title of property.1

1

In the modern real estate sales practice, actions to remove expired mortgages
from the titles of real property are rare. Title companies, which insure the transactions
between buyer and seller and the condition of real property titles, recognize that stale
13

In the case at bar, Appellants and Respondents were energetically engaged in litigation
to establish the validity of their claims. Appellants were "active, adverse claimants" of the
Respondents. Therefore, the Respondents' claims were not "against apparent or stale claims"
and the statute of limitations is applicable.
The Court of Appeals ruling in Nolan failed to recognize that the statute of limitations
was applicable to cases where "affirmative relief was sought. The Court of Appeals failed
to address whether Respondents' claims were "against apparent and stale claims" or whether
they sought "affirmative relief." Based on the "affirmative relief standard, Respondents
sought "affirmative relief in their claims against Appellants. Thus, Respondents' claims
are subject to the statute of limitations.
As a result of the analysis of the "affirmative relief standard and the "apparent and
stale claims" standard, the statute of limitations is applicable to Respondents' claims in this
action. This Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeals decision.
B.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES IN CASES WHERE TRUSTEE
OF AN IRREVOCABLE TRUST BREACHES HIS TRUST
In Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, the Court of Appeals' decision below

held that no statute of limitations applied to Respondents' claims since the settlor and trustee
of the trusts, Malu:
. . . had no power to revoke the trusts and could deal with the trusts' assets

mortgages are not encumbrances to title and the title companies simply insure that the title
of real property is free and clear of expired mortgages.
14

only as provided in the trust instruments. Further, the beneficiaries had
equitable title to the trusts' assets because the trust instruments provided no
means for the trustees to take or transfer those assets from the beneficiaries
without their consent.
Id. at f 15. The Court of Appeals ignored Appellants' claim that Malu repudiated and
breached the trusts by exercising dominion over the Property as if it were his own.
Appellants further argued that when Malu repudiated and breached the trusts, the statutes of
limitations applied. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider Appellants' claims of
repudiation and breach of the trusts and in failing to impose the statute of limitations on
Respondents' claims for possession to the Property.
The doctrines of breach and repudiation of the trusts are viable defenses asserted by
Appellants. In his dissent, Judge Jackson, stated that the majority opinion had disregarded
these doctrines of trust law:
The main opinion concludes that Malu "could not transfer the property
in the trusts, as a trustee, other than as directed in the trusts." This evades the
well-established principle that a trustee can breach the trust, thereby triggering
the statute of limitations. See 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 125 (2002) ("The trust
relationship may continue until it is terminated by a repudiation by the trustee
.. .."); 76 Am Jur. 2d Trusts 654 (2005)(stating that the statute of limitations
is tolled only "until the trustee openly repudiates the trust"). The United States
Supreme Court and Utah's courts have both long recognized this rule. See,
Hammondv. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224,252 (1892) ("[W]here a trustee [breaches
the trust], the cestuis que trust are entitled to [take action] subject to the
qualifications that the application for such relief must be made within
reasonable time . . .."); Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U.S. 151, 157 (1885)
("[W]hen the trust is repudiated b y . . . the trustee who claims to hold the trust
property as his own,... statute of limitations will begin to run."); Wasden v.
Coltharp, 631 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1981) (per curiam) ("Where the trustee
denies the obligation of his trust and the beneficiary has notice of his
repudiation, the statute begins to run."); Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47,
15

56, 44 P, 652, 654 (1896) ("[W]hen the trustee denies the trust and assumes
ownership of the trust property,... then the statute of limitations attaches.");
Woodv. Fox, 8 Utah 380, 32 P. 48, 52 (1893) ("The law is that the statute of
limitations begins to run against a claim growing out of a trust from the time
the trustee repudiates the trust and the cestui que trust has notice.").
Id. at Tf 29. The trustee's repudiation and breach of the trusts triggers the application of the
statute of limitations to Respondents' claims. The Court of Appeals decision failed to even
address these doctrines and failed to impose the statute of limitations on Respondents'
claims.
Respondents argue that there is no statute of limitations between the trustee and the
cestui que trust. Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47, 56, 44 P. 652, 654 (1896)("It is well
settled that, as between trustee and cestui que trust, the statute of limitations does not operate,
in cases of express or direct trusts, so long as such trusts continue."). Although this
statement is accurate, it is inapplicable to this case. When the quiet title claim of the
beneficiaries is against third parties, not members of the trust, then the statute of limitations
is applicable to the quiet title action. Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 Utah 108, 66 P. 773, 778
(1901)("The rule that the statute of limitations does not bar a trust estate holds only between
cestui que trust and trustee, not as between cestui que trust and trustee on one side, and
strangers on the other; for that would make the statute [of limitations] of no force at all. .

Appellants assert that Malu repudiated and breached the trusts by seeking to assert an
ownership interest in the trusts' properties and by bequeathing the trusts' properties pursuant
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to his will.

However, the Court of Appeals decision ignores Defendants' assertion of

repudiation and breach. Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, ^ 13-16. The practical
effect of the Court of Appeals decision denies defendants the right to assert breach and
repudiation of the trusts as defenses to Respondents' claims. The issue of Malu's breach or
repudiation of the trusts was not factually developed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals
erred in eliminating repudiation and breach of the trusts as defenses when there has been no
fact finding in relation to these issue. The Court of Appeals must therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' ruling essentially held that the statute of limitations does not
apply to quiet title actions. This is contrary to the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals should be reversed. Respondents sought "affirmative relief in their
petition to have the court validate their title to the Property, declare their title superior to
Appellants, invalidate the Deed of Distribution conveying the Property from Malu's estate
to Appellants, terminate the lis pendens filed by Appellants, invalidate the existing lease on
the Property, and grant Respondents possession to the Property. (R. 132)
The Court of Appeals' holding that the trustee cannot repudiate and breach trust
agreements contradicts this Court's opinions in Wasden, Thomas, and Wood. Repudiation
and breach should not be eliminated as theories of this case when they are viable doctrines
of trust law and when the Appellants have not had the opportunity to factually develop the
facts relating to breach and repudiation.

17

The Court of Appeals' decision in Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272,
contradicts established precedent of the Utah Supreme Court without sufficient explanation
or justification. The Supreme Court should review the case, settle these disputed areas of the
law, and relieve the litigants and the bar of the confusion that obviously accompanies these
areas of statute of limitations and trust law by reversing the Court of Appeals.
DATED this T

day of November, 2005.
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Hoopiiaina Trusts; Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan, individually; and
Michael Gatlin, individually,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, personal representative of the Estate of
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Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, individually; Marlin M. Forsyth, individually;
George K. Fadel, individually; Michael Gatlin; ISG Resources
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OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Case No. 20040309-CA
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Third District, Salt Lake Department, 020910872
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
Attorneys: Nolan J. Olsen, Midvale, for Appellants
Ralph C. Petty, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
51 Plaintiffs Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan (Michelle), both
individually and as trustee for the Malualani B. Hoopiiaina Trusts,
and Michael Gatlin (Michael) appeal from the trial court's order of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants Cuma S. Hoopiiaina (Cuma),
both individually and as personal representative of the Estate of
Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, et al. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
12 "When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment,
'we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,' here," Plaintiffs.
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25,13, 523 Utah Adv.
Rep. 39 (citation omitted). "We recite the facts of this case
accordingly." Id.
13 This intrafamily dispute pits the grandchildren of Malualani B.
Hoopiiaina (Malu)--Michelle and Michael—against Malu's widow, their
stepgrandmother—Cuma--and Cuma's son, Marlin Forsyth.
14 In 1974, attorney George Fadel (Fadel) prepared two trust
agreements for Malu. Malu executed those agreements, creating two
irrevocable trusts (Trust I and Trust II). The first agreement
conveyed title of real property located at 349 West 700 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, to Trust I. The second conveyed title of real
property located at 345 West 700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
property related to a business located at that address to Trust II.
These conveyances were recorded by the Salt Lake County Recorder
shortly after they were executed. Additionally, both trust agreements
provide that additional property or assets may be deposited into the
trusts after their creation.
15 Both trusts had three trustees, including Malu and Inez Gatlin
(Inez)-^- as trustees for both. Trust I included LaRayne J. Hartman as
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a trustee and was to pay her $400 a month from the time that she
turned sixty-five until her death. Upon LaRayne J. Hartmanfs death,
Inez, Michael, and Michelle would each receive one third of the
income of the trust, until Michelle reached twenty-one years of age,
at which point the trust was to terminate and the res would be
divided equally among the three. Trust II included Donald Hartman as
the third trustee and was to pay him $300 a month from the time that
he turned sixty-five until his death, at which time the res would be
distributed in the same manner as Trust I. It is undisputed that
LaRayne J. and Donald Hartman are deceased. Michelle has turned
twenty-one, but the record does not disclose when that occurred.
16 Malu died on May 20, 1997. Inez and the other trustees had
predeceased him. However, prior to his death, in 1996, Malu drafted a
holographic will and codicils to it, making no mention of the trusts.
However, one codicil bequeathed "the 349 West properties 700 South"
to Cuma and her son. Another codicil stated, "My daughter Inez Gatlin
having died, I remove all provisions for Inez and her children."
11 Malufs estate was probated in a hearing on June 25, 1997, and
Cuma was appointed personal representative. Fadel, Malu's attorney
from 1974, was involved in the proceedings. Though Michelle and
Michael were children when their grandfather created the trusts,
Michelle believed that the trusts existed because Inez had told her
of the trusts1 existence when Michelle was a child. Based on this
belief, Michelle voiced an objection at the probate hearing, but
Fadel told her that there were no trusts, that her grandfather had
disinherited her, and that she had no interest in the estate.
Following this conversation, Michelle waived her objection. Shortly
after his grandfather's death, Michael also inquired of Fadel, and
Fadel also told him that there were no trusts and that he had no
interest in the estate.^ L
18 Though Inez signed the trust documents as a trustee, Plaintiffs
never had access to the trust documents. Moreover, while Plaintiffs
believed that a trust existed, there is no indication in the record
that Plaintiffs had any specific knowledge of the details of the
trusts, including the identity of the trustees or disposition of the
trusts1 assets.
59 On August 20, 1998, as personal representative of Malufs
estate, Cuma deeded the property at issue to herself and her son.
Sometime after the probate hearing, Michelle contacted an attorney
who advised her that he could do nothing without the actual trust
documents. Michelle took no further action until 2002, when she and
Michael were contacted by a private detective and their present
counsel, who informed them that they were beneficiaries of the
trusts. Within a week, on August 26, 2002, Michelle filed a probate
petition to have herself appointed as successor trustee for both
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trusts and to transfer Inez's interest in the trusts' assets to
Michelle and Michael. In September 2002, Judge Noel signed an order
appointing Michelle as successor trustee as well as an order that
distributed their mother's—Inez's—share of the trusts to
Plaintiffs. As successor trustee, Michelle distributed the assets of
the trusts to herself and Michael and recorded deeds to the
properties on September 10, 2002.
510 Shortly thereafter, Cuma filed a motion to set aside the order
appointing the successor trustee. On October 10, 2002, Michelle filed
a civil suit, which was assigned to Judge Nehring, against Cuma, et
al., to quiet title to the disputed real property, to recover other
trust property, for damages, and for an accounting.—^- In January
2003, Judge Henriod ruled on Cuma's motion and set aside the
appointment of Michelle as successor trustee. In March 2003, Judge
Nehring ordered that Michelle's probate proceeding be consolidated
with the civil suit.
511 Eventually, Cuma and her son moved for summary judgment, which
Judge Quinn granted. Judge Quinn determined that either a three or
four-year statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1006 (1993), 78-12-25 (2002). Further, Judge Quinn
ruled that while the discovery rule applied, Plaintiffs knew of the
facts necessary to put them on notice to act. Plaintiffs appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
512 Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and "the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review a
trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, affording no
deference to their legal conclusions. See Wayment v. Clear Channel
Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25,515, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 39.
ANALYSIS
I. Violation of Trusts
513 Malu executed two trust agreements in 1974, creating
irrevocable trusts, with Plaintiffs as the eventual sole
beneficiaries when they each became twenty-one years old and the
other named beneficiaries died. Trusts are succinctly described in
Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, as follows:
It is well settled that [a] trust is a form of ownership in
which the legal title to property is vested in a trustee, who
has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of
the beneficiaries. Once the settlor has created the trust he
is no longer the owner of the trust property and has only
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such ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him
in the trust instrument. Thus, a settlor has the power to
modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such
power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the trust.
Furthermore, the creation of a trust involves the transfer of
property interests in the trust subject-matter to the
beneficiaries. These interests cannot be taken from [the
beneficiaries] except in accordance with a provision of the
trust instrument.
Id. at 59 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations
omitted).
514 Applying these principles to the trusts in this case, Malu, as
settlor, did not reserve to himself the power to revoke or modify the
trusts. Both trusts included a provision stating: "This Trust shall
be irrevocable. At no time shall any beneficial interest in the Trust
property inure to the Settlor." Accordingly, Malu could not revoke
the trusts. See In re Flake, 2003 UT 17,513, 71 P.3d 589 (stating "a
settlor 'has the power to modify a trust only if and to the extent
that such a power was reserved by the terms of the trust1" (quoting
Kline v. Department of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App.
1989))); Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977) (noting
the settlor may not revoke the trust if he has not reserved a power
of revocation). An irrevocable trust may be revoked only if "all
beneficiaries thereof consent." Clayton, 565 P.2d at 1133. There is
no assertion in this case that the trusts' beneficiaries ever
consented to revocation of the trusts.
515 As a trustee, Malu had no power to revoke the trusts and could
deal with the trusts' assets only as provided in the trust
instruments. Further, the beneficiaries had equitable title to the
trusts' assets because the trust instruments provide no means for the
trustees to take or transfer those assets from the beneficiaries
without their consent.
516 Accordingly, title to the trusts' assets was vested in
Plaintiffs, and Malu could not transfer title to those assets via his
will. Cf^ In re Estate of Jones, 259 F. Supp. 951, 952 (D.D.C. 1966)
(mem.) (ruling property to which [a settlor] did not have a vested
right at his death is not an asset of his estate). Thus, Malu's
bequeathal of the property to Cuma and Cuma's subsequent transfer of
the property to herself and her son were void and of no effect.
II. Statutes of Limitation
517 The trial court held that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by
either a three or four-year statute of limitations. The trial court's
order referenced the three-year limitations in Utah Code Section 753-1006, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 (1993) (actions against
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probate distributions), and the four-year limitations contained in
Utah Code section 78-12-25(1) and (3), see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25
(1), (3) (2002) (actions on an oral contract, etc., or relief not
otherwise provided by law). The trial court also held that the
discovery rule applied. Also, whichever statute applied, the trial
court concluded that as of June 25, 1997, when Malu!s estate was
probated, Plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of the facts to put
them on notice to inquire, and that their failure to act until more
than five years later resulted in their action being barred. While
Defendants do not dispute the applicability of the discovery rule in
this appeal, they argue it does not render Plaintiffs' action timely.
518 Plaintiffs sought various types of relief in their
consolidated actions, including: quiet title, non-real property trust
assets, damages, an accounting, and appointment of Michelle as
successor trustee of the two trusts. The early Utah case of Brantinq
v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995 (1915), states that
We are very clearly of the opinion that . . . actions by
which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud from or to
quiet the title to real property as against apparent or stale
claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, yet we
are also clear that all actions in which the principle
purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief . . . come
within the [statute of limitations].
Id. at 1001; see also Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81
P.2d 374, 376 (1938) (reiterating the above-cited rule from
Brantinq). This rule "is premised upon the fact that a quiet title
action, as its name connotes, is one to quiet an existing title . . .
and not one brought to establish title . . . . [T]he effect of a
decree quieting title is not to vest title but rather is to perfect
an existing title." State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Santiago,
590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1979).
519 Although Plaintiffs sought multiple forms of relief, they were
primarily seeking to remove the cloud of Cumafs deed of the real
property, as administrator of Malufs estate, to herself and her son.
Further, the request that Michelle be named as successor trustee of
the two trusts after the death of all named trustees, would not seem
to be time barred. In order to wind up the trusts, as directed in the
trust documents there must be a trustee with the legal authority to
deed the properties to the named beneficiaries. Thus, the claims to
appoint a successor trustee and to quiet title are not time barred.
520 The remaining claims for relief—personal property, damages,
and an accounting—are, however, subject to limitation. While there
is no dispute that the discovery rule applies, there is a question of
whether it affords Plaintiffs relief from the statutory limitation
periods. This rule was recently clarified in Russell Packard
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Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. In Russell
Packard, the Utah Supreme Court identified two types of discovery
rules: (1) an "internal discovery rule" where a statute of
limitations specifically includes, by its own terms, application of
the discovery rule, id. at 3121; and (2) an "equitable discovery
rule," where the "relevant statute of limitations provides only a
fixed limitations period with no statutory discovery rule exception."
Id. at 524.
521 None of the possible applicable statutes of limitation in this
case contain an internal discovery rule. We must determine,
therefore, if the trial court correctly applied the equitable
discovery rule in determining that Plaintiffs' claims were barred.
There are two situations in which the equitable discovery rule may
toll a statute of limitations:
(1) "where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of
action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct," and (2) "where the case presents exceptional
circumstances and the application of the general rule would
be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the
defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of
action."
Id. at 525 (quoting Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229,
1231 (Utah 1995)). Plaintiffs' arguments are confined to the first
situation, where concealment or misleading conduct is asserted. In
examining a concealment claim, "the rule requires an evaluation of
the reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct in light of the
defendant's fraudulent or misleading conduct." Id. at 526. A party
seeking an enlargement of time under the equitable discovery rule
must show that he or she "has acted in a reasonable and diligent
manner" and that "'given the defendant's actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory period.'"
Id. (quoting Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah
1992) ) .^522 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
see Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25,53, 523 Utah
Adv. Rep. 39: Plaintiffs did not know the details of the trusts
created by their grandfather when they were very young, much less
know if they were irrevocable, assuming they would have understood
the import of that term. Plaintiffs never saw copies of the trust
agreements. After Malu's death, Defendants, through Fadel, told
Plaintiffs that the trusts no longer existed and that they had no
interest in Malu's estate. They believed what Fadel told them. After
learning the true status of the trusts, they did not think that Fadel
had intentionally deceived them, but that he had either forgotten or
was mistaken about the law. Nevertheless, they relied on his advice.
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Michelle, however, went a step further and consulted another
attorney. He told her he could not help her unless she had copies of
the trust. It wasn't until 2002 that a private detective contacted
Plaintiffs and informed them that the trusts had not terminated. They
promptly filed an action at that time.
523 Determination of when a plaintiff would reasonably discover
facts relative to a cause of action when a defendant has
affirmatively concealed facts "is a fhighly fact-dependent legal
question[]f that is 'necessarily a matter left to trial courts and
finders of fact.1" Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14 at 539 (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs did not file a cross-motion
for summary judgment with the trial court. On appeal, Plaintiffs
assert there are issues of fact that preclude summary judgment for
Defendants. We agree that summary judgment is inappropriate.
524 "f[W]eighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in
light of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action
necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude [judgment as
a matter of law] in all but the clearest of cases.'" Id. (second
alteration in original) (quoting Berenda v. Lanqford, 914 P.2d 45, 54
(Utah 1996)). This case does not qualify as one of the "clearest of
cases." Id. A fact finder could certainly determine that Plaintiffs
acted reasonably in not bringing suit within the applicable statute
of limitations. Indeed, it would be hard to find otherwise.
CONCLUSION
525 We hold that Malu, as settlor of the two irrevocable trusts
did not have title to the property at issue, and therefore, could not
bequeath it as part of his estate. He similarly could not transfer
the property in the trusts, as a trustee, other than as directed in
the trusts, to the surviving beneficiaries. Plaintiffs' claim to
quiet title to the real property to remove the cloud on title created
by the deed to Cuma and her son is not subject to a statute of
limitations and may be pursued. Likewise, the petition to have
Michelle appointed as trustee of the trusts is consistent with the
trust instruments for the purpose of fulfilling the trust terms.
526 Accordingly, we remand for the purpose of a trial on the issue
of whether the statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiffs' other
causes of action are tolled by the equitable discovery rule and for
other proceedings consistent therewith.

Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge
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127 I CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

JACKSON, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part):
128 I concur in part and dissent in part.
I. TRUSTEE'S BREACH OF TRUST
129 The main opinion concludes that Malu "could not transfer the
property in the trusts, as a trustee, other than as directed in the
trusts." This evades the well-established principle that a trustee
can breach the trust, thereby triggering the statute of limitations.
See 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 125 (2002) ("The trust relationship may
continue until it is terminated by a repudiation by the trustee . . .
. " ) ; 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 654 (2005) (stating that the statute of
limitations is tolled only "until the trustee openly repudiates the
trust"). The United States Supreme Court and Utah's courts have both
long recognized this rule. See Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224, 252
(1892) ("[W]here a trustee [breaches the trust], the cestuis que
trust are entitled to [take action] subject to the qualification that
the application for such relief must be made within reasonable time .
. . . " ) ; Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U.S. 151, 157 (1885) ("[W]hen the
trust is repudiated by . . . the trustee who claims to hold the trust
property as his own, . . . the statute of limitation will begin to
run."); Wasden v. Coltharp, 631 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1981) (per
curiam) ("Where the trustee denies the obligation of his trust and
the beneficiary has notice of his repudiation, the statute begins to
run."); Thomas v. Glendinninq, 13 Utah 47, 56, 44 P. 652, 654 (1896)
("[W]hen the trustee denies the trust and assumes ownership of the
trust property, . . . then the statute of limitations attaches.");
Wood v. Fox, 8 Utah 380, 32 P. 48, 52 (1893) ("The law is that the
statute of limitations begins to run against a claim growing out of a
trust from the time the trustee repudiates the trust and the cestui
que trust has notice.").
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
130 The main opinion also concludes that the quiet title action is
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not subject to a statute of limitations. In Brantinq v. Salt Lake
City, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
[W]e are very clearly of the opinion that . . . actions by
which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud from or to
quiet title to real property as against apparent or stale
claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, yet we
are also clear that all actions in which the principle
purpose is to obtain some affirmative relief . . . come
within the [statute of limitations] . . . .
47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995, 1001 (1915) (emphasis added). This court has
ruled that "[a] statute [of limitations] fapplied to all actions,
both legal and equitable, in which affirmative relief is sought.f"
Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis in
original) (quoting American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 84 0
P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1992)). To determine whether a claim seeks
affirmative relief, the key distinction is not whether the claim is
styled as a quiet title action but whether it is "against apparent or
stale claims" as opposed to an active battle between adverse parties.
In Brantinq itself and all of the cases that Brantinq cites on this
point, the courts concluded that the parties sought affirmative
relief where there were active, adverse claimants.-^ Thus, Nolan and
Gatlinfs action is not exempt from a statute of limitations merely
because it is a quiet title action.
531 While I take issue with the main opinion for failing to
recognize that a trustee's actions may trigger a limitations period,
without more evidence, I would not adopt the Defendants' argument
that Malu's actions in fact triggered the limitations period.
Instead, I would instruct the trial court to permit the Defendants to
provide such evidence on remand.-^III. TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD
532 I also take issue with both the trial court and the main
opinion because Nolan was not Gatlin's agent, and her actions and
knowledge should not be imputed to Gatlin.
133 Further, the main opinion remands to the trial court to weigh
the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs1 conduct in light of the
Defendants1 steps to conceal the cause of action. Because the trial
court stated that it had considered the discovery rule, I would more
specifically outline what factors the trial court did not but should
consider. Specifically, the trial court should "apply a balancing
test" to determine when "a rigid application of the statute . . .
[will] be irrational and unjust." Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20,g[ll, 998
P.2d 262 (quotations and citation omitted). This test "weights] the
hardship imposed on the claimant[s] . . . against any prejudice to
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the defendant resulting from the passage of time." Id. (quotations
and citation omitted). In this balance, the trial court should
consider that (1) the Defendants never had any legal or equitable
claim to the trust properties whereas Nolan and Gatlin had both,-^(2) Nolan did take some action, (3) Cuma f s agent Fadel misled Nolan
and Gatlin, and (4) "the close familial relationship [s] involved" may
have affected the parties actions. Id. at 111; see also Walker v.
Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (1965); Acott v. Tomlinson,
9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (1959).
III. LENGTH OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD
534 I also take issue with the main opinion's failure to examine
and specify which statute of limitations applies to which cause of
action. The trial court ruled that one of several statutes of
limitations applied, and the main opinion adds little clarity.-^J535 First, the claim for the return of the rents and lease
payments seeks return of mesne profits. Section 78-12-23(1) sets a
six-year period of limitations "for the mesne profits of real
property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(1) (1995). This specific statute
controls over any more general one. See Cathco, Inc. v. Valentiner
Crane Brunjes Onyon Architects, 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah, 1997) (" [T]
he more specific provision will govern over the more general
provision." (quotations and citation omitted)). It is uncontested
that Nolan and Gatlin brought a claim within six years. Since I would
hold that Nolan and Gatlin have held equitable title to the trust
property since the formation of the trusts, they are entitled to the
mesne profits regardless of the application of the statutes of
limitations to the other claims.
5136 Second, the gravamen of the wrongful deprivation claim lies in
tort and does not straightforwardly stem from the trust instrument.
Tort claims for the taking of personal property are governed by a
three-year limitations period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(2)
(1995) . The other tort claims, including the wrongful deprivation of
real property, are subject to a four-year limitations period. See id.
§ 78-12-25(3) (1995). The punitive damage claim arises out of the
tort claims and should be treated as ancillary to them with an
identical period of limitation.
5137 Third, in essence, the remaining claims all ask for the return
of the trust property. The trial court's analysis was flawed to the
extent that it considered section 75-3-1006 because neither "the
claim of any claimant," as defined by Utah Code Title 75,-^- nor "the
right of any heir or devisee" is at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006
(1995). Moreover, the Defendants 1 argument for section 78-12-19
should fail because Nolan and Gatlin are not "claiming under the
decedent"—their claim does not stem from Malu's ownership but from
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their own—and, this is not an action to set aside a sale. Id. § 7512-19 (1995) .
538 Without explanation, the supreme court determined that section
78-12-25 limited recovery in a dispute between a beneficiary and a
constructive trustee. See Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20,59, 998 P.2d 262.
Section 78-12-25 addresses in one subsection actions "upon a
contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing" and provides "for relief not otherwise provided by law" in
another subsection. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1), (3). It limits
recovery for these actions to four years. See id. Although the
court's rationale for applying this statute was never made clear, the
reason may be that although the obligation stemmed from a written
instrument, the relief lay in equity, which is "not . . . provided by
law." Id. While there is implicit authority that would point us to
Utah Code section 78-12-23(2) (1995), which grants a six-year period
to bring claims "founded upon an instrument in writing," namely
Thomas v. Glendinninq, 13 Utah 47, 44 P. 652 (1896), I feel that it
is our duty to follow the supreme court's lead, even if its steps are
shrouded.
539 Thus, on remand after determining how long the limitations
period should be tolled, I would have the trial court apply a fouryear limitations period, except as otherwise noted.
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES
540 "[WJhere an appellate court finds that it is necessary to
remand a case for further proceedings, it has the duty of fpass[ing]
on matters [that] may then become material.'" Bair v. Axi^qm Design^
L.L.C., 2001 UT 20,522, 20 P.3d 388 (first and second alterations in
original) (citation omitted). I take issue with the main opinion's
failure to address these points.
A. Ending of the Limitations Period
541 On remand, it may be necessary to determine when to stop
counting to determine whether the limitations period expired. Two
dates are possible: (i) August 26, 2002, when Nolan instituted a
probate proceeding to have herself appointed as successor trustee and
to convey Inez Gatlin's interest to herself and Gatlin, or (ii)
October 10, 2002, when Nolan brought a civil claim directly against
the Defendants. This appeal flows most directly from the civil claim,
as the heading implies, but the probate proceeding was consolidated
into that case. For the most part, Nolan effectively sought the same
result from both actions --i.e., control over the trust property. And
to that extent, the commencement of this action should be the first
day on which Nolan took legal action to protect her interest in the
trusts, August 26, 2002. On the other hand, to the extent that the
civil case asks for punitive damages and tort claims, which were not

raised in the probate proceeding, those actions were commenced on
October 10, 2002.

B. Dowry
142 Cuma has raised the argument that because she had dowry rights
to the trust property when Malu created the trusts, Malu could never
have devised all of the property into the trusts. Utah Code section
74-4-3 was in effect and Malu and Cuma were married at the time that
Malu transferred the property into the trusts. See Utah Code Ann. §
74-4-3 (1953) (repealed 1977) (providing that n[o]ne-third in value
of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by
the husband at any time during the marriage, to which the wife has
made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be set apart as her
property in fee simple, if she survives him . . . " ) . This interest,
however, did "not vest until the death of her husband." Boise Cascade
Corp. v. Meyer, 568 P.2d 755, 756 (1977). Because the provision was
repealed before Malu died, Cuma's dower interests never vested;
instead, she was protected by the elective share statutes, Utah Code
sections 75-2-201 to -207. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-2-201 to -207
(1995). There is no information in the record to determine whether
Malu adequately provided for Cuma, given that the trust property was
not properly part of the estate. I would instruct the trial court
that Cuma is not entitled to dower rights under Utah Code section 744-3.
CONCLUSION
143 In conclusion, I concur in the result to reverse this case to
the trial court. On remand, though, I would have the trial court
permit the Defendants to introduce evidence that Malu breached the
trust and triggered the limitations period. I dissent from the main
opinion!s conclusion that the quiet title action is exempt from a
statute of limitations because the action requests affirmative
relief. I would also specifically point out the factors in the
discovery rule test that the trial court ignored to determine whether
the Plaintiffs should both be charged with knowledge of Malu's
breach. I would also make it clear that if the trial court determines
that the statute of limitations was triggered, the trial court should
apply a four-year statute of limitations to the quiet title claims, a
three-year statute of limitations to the tort claims for personal
property, and a six-year statute of limitations for the mesne
profits.
144 I respectfully dissent in part and concur in the result.
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Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Inez Gatlin is Malu's daughter and Plaintiffs1 mother.
2. Fadel was legal counsel for the trusts in an action that was
initiated in 1992, resulting in an unpublished memorandum decision
issued in 1995. See Williams v. Hoopiiaina, No. 930758-CA (Utah Ct.
App. Jan. 31, 1995). Although Plaintiffs1 civil complaint originally
named Fadel as a defendant, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed him.
3. Originally, because Michelle and her counsel could not locate
Michael, but because they believed that he had an interest in the
trusts, he was named as a defendant. Later, Michael retained
Michellefs counsel and was made a plaintiff in the action.
4. Defendants contend that the discovery rule is not applicable
because none of the named defendants still in the case is alleged to
have concealed facts from Plaintiffs. We do not agree. Although Fadel
is no longer a party to this action, he was counsel for Defendants in
the probate of Malu's estate and represented the trusts in the 1995
action in this court. See Williams, No. 930758-CA.
1. See Brantinq v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995, 1001
(1915); see also Hecht v. Slaney, 14 P. 88 (Cal. 1887) (cited in
Brantinq and finding that a statute of limitations applied in a
dispute between active, adverse litigants); Irey v. Markey, 32 N.E.
309 (Ind. 1892) (same); Stonehill v. Swartz, 28 N.E. 620 (Ind. 1891)
(same); Royse v. Turnbauqh, 20 N.E. 485, 487 (Ind. 1889) (same);
Caress v. Foster, 62 Ind. 145 (1878) (same); see, e.g., Davidsen v.
Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374, 377 (1938) (holding that
"if [a plaintiff's] relief . . . depend[ed] . . . upon the
cancellation of a deed for fraud or mistake, he must bring his action
within the period provided by law for an action based upon that
ground") .
2. The Defendants assert that a statutory period of limitations began
to run when Nolan and Gatlin received notice that Malufs will devised
the property to Cuma and her son. I do not think that it is yet clear
whether Malu breached the trust. Because "[t]rustees must act with
good faith, loyalty, fairness, candor and honesty toward the trust
beneficiaries," 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 349 (2005), to breach a
trust, a trustee must act in bad faith. "Bad faith is . . . when a
thing is done dishonestly and not merely negligently." ResearchPlanning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1984)
(quotations and citation omitted). At present, the record lacks any
evidence that Malu acted with intent, bad faith, or dishonesty. The
breach that, on the present record, has been alleged is far from
clear. Neither the sentence in Malu's holographic will nor his
failure to mention the trusts expresses anything like the requisite
clarity to deny the trust.

3. By operation of the Statute of Uses, when the terms of the trusts
were fulfilled so that the trustees1 (or trustee's) only duties were
to deliver the trust property to the beneficiaries, the Plaintiffs
were vested with legal title to the properties. See 27 Henry 8, c. 10
(1535 Eng.); see also Garth v. Cotton, Eng. Rep. 392 (Ch. 1753)
(recognizing "jus in rem" and jus "ad rem"); Henderson v. Adams, 15
Utah 30, 48 P. 398, 401 (1897) (stating that the rule of the Statute
of Uses "is part of the common law of this state."). Once Nolan
turned twenty-one and the Hartmans died, the trust became passive,
the Statute of Uses took effect, and the Plaintiffs became seised
with the legal title to the trust property. Thus, Nolan and Gatlin
were holders of both the legal and equitable title in the property in
the LaRayne Hartman Trust after Nolan turned twenty-one and LaRayne
Hartman died, and they held legal and equitable title in the property
in the Donald Hartman Trust after Nolan turned twenty-one and Donald
Hartman died.
4. The trial court ruled that Nolan and Gatlinfs claims were barred
by Utah Code section 75-3-1006, 78-12-25(3), or 78-12-25(1). The
Defendants argue that section 78-12-19 applies in this case.
5. Utah Code section 75-1-201(4) specifically excludes actions of
this type from the definition of a "claim." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201
(4) (1995),
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CumaS* Hoopiiaina
1767 So. Texas Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Mail lax notice to Cuma S. Hoopiiaina at above address.
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DEED OF DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
This Deed is made by Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, as Personal Representative of the
estate of Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, also known as Malualani Hoopiiania, deceased, Grantor, to
Cuma S. Hoopiiaina of Salt Lake County, Utah, and Marlin M. Forsyth of Davis County,
Utah, Grantees.
WHEREAS Grantor is the qualified Personal Representative of said estate, filed
as Probate No. 973900755 ES in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and
WHEREAS Grantees are entitled to distribution of the hereinafter described real
property,
THEREFORE, for valuable consideration received, Grantor quitclaims,
transfers and conveys to Grantees, as joint tenants wdth rights of survivorship, those tracts of
land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more particularly described in Exhibit "A" which is
attached hereto and made a part hereof, together with any and all buildings, improvements,
appurtenances and water rights..

Executed this ^^

day of August, 1998.

Cuma S. Hoopiiaina
/j
Personal Representative or{hc Estate of
Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, also known as
Malualani Hoopiiania, deceased
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

The foregoing instrument was aclcnovvlcdged before me this 7-0 day of
August, 1998 by Cuma S. Hoopiiaina as Personal Representative of the Estate of Malualani B.
Hoopiiaina, also known as Malualani Hoopiiania, deceased.
«V

NOTARY PUBLIC
PAMELA T.W1NDT
1304 Foolhlll Dr.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
My Commission Explrns
Moy 9. 2000
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EXHIBIT A
Those tracts of land in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
described as follows:
Commencing at the Northwest comer of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat
"A", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 78.5 feet,
thence South 200 feet, thence East 13.2 feet, thence South 12
feet, thence East 73.3 feet, thence South 118 feet, thence West
10 rods, thence North 20 rods to the point of beginning.
Tax Parcel No. 15-12-130-002-0000
Beginning at a point 44 feet West and 212 feet South from the
Northeast corner of Lot 6, Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake City
Survey, and running thence North 27 feet, thence West 42.5 feet,
thence South 15 feet, thence East 13.2 feet, tlience South 12 feet,
thence East 29.3 feet to the point of beginning.
Tax Parcel No. 15-12-130-004-0000
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Cuma S. Hoopiiaina
1767 So. Texas Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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DEED OF DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

This Deed is made by Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, as Personal Representative of the
estate of Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, also known as Malu B. Hoopiiaina, deceased, Grantor, to
Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, individually, Grantee, whose address is 1767 So. Texas Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84108.
WHEREAS Grantor is the qualified Personal Representative of said estate, filed
as Probate No. 973900755 ES in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and
WHEREAS Grantee is entitled to distribution of the hereinafter described real
property,
THEREFORE, for valuable consideration received, Grantor quitclaims,
transfers and conveys to Grantee that tract of land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more
particularly described in Exhibit "A" which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, together
with any and all buildings, improvements, appurtenances and water rights..
Executed this £JL day o f August, 1998.

GO
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Cuma S. Hoopiiaina
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, also known as
Malu B. Hoopiiaina, deceased
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STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this zo day of
August, 1998 by Cuma S. Hoopiiaina as Personal Representative of the Estate of Malualani B.
Hoopiiaina, also known as Malu B, Hoopiiaina, deceased.
NOTARY PUBLIC
PAMELA
T. WtNDT
/r/r^*3\YA
1304 Foothill Dr.
$y&ti$\i Si Belt
Itk* City, Ulah B4108
VivJ^lJ^y&y My Commission Explras
May 0,2000
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EXHIBIT A
That tract of land in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described
as follows:
Commencing 78.5 feet East from the Northwest corner of Lot 6,
Block 12, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; thence East 42.5 feet;
thence South 185 feet; thence West 42.5 feet; thence North 185
feet to the point of beginning.
Tax Parcel No. 15-12-130-003-0000

